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Substantial Evidence Review in Social Security Cases as
an Issue of Fact
Morton Denlow*
I. INTRODUCTION
Social security cases are a substantial presence in federal court.
During the one-year period ending September 30, 2005, a total of
15,487 social security cases were filed in the United States district
courts.' One-hundred forty-three were filed in the Northern District
of Illinois,2 which means a new social security case was filed more
than every other business day. Other district courts had substantially
more.
3
By the time a social security case arrives on the desk of a district
or magistrate judge in a federal district court, the claimant typically
has been trying for years to obtain disability benefits. The case is of
enormous financial and emotional importance to the claimant, and
she may be quite desperate and down on her luck.4
* Morton Denlow is the Presiding Magistrate Judge in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Judge Denlow gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of his law clerks, Matthew Topic and Matthew
Skoglund, and judicial extern, Hunter Hogan, in the preparation of this article.
1. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS, Table 5-9 (Sept. 2005) available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/tables/s9.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id. One district had more than 1000 cases commence, one district more than
700, two districts more than 500, three districts more than 400, three districts more
than 300, and seventeen other districts had more than 200 cases open. Id.
4. Linda Durston & Linda Mills, Toward a New Dynamic in Poverty Client
Empowerment: The Rhetoric, Politics, and Therapeutics of Opening Statements in
Social Security Disability Hearings, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 140 (1996).
"Many, perhaps most, claimants seeking benefits with the Social Security disability
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The Social Security disability system impacts millions of people
and involves enormous amounts of money. In December of 2005, 8.3
million people received disability benefits.5 Total expenditures for
the Social Security disability program in 2005 were 88 billion
dollars, and administrative expenses for 2005 accounted for 2.6% of
total expenditures. 6
Given the profound importance of disability benefits to claimants
and the tremendous amount of judicial and administrative resources
required to process and distribute those claims, it is critically
important that federal courts process social security appeals in a fair
and efficient manner. Unfortunately, our current practices do not
achieve these goals.
At the federal district court level, the Social Security Act permits
claimants to argue that the factual determinations made by the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who decided the case are not
supported by "substantial evidence." 7 This review requires the district
court judge to review the entire administrative record, which
generally consists of hundreds of pages, to determine whether there
was a reasonable factual basis for the denial of benefits. 8
Consequently, district and magistrate judges often write lengthy
decisions after combing through the record in reaching their
decisions, 9 a process that this article argues is factual in nature.
system are disabled in part because they never found a voice within the larger and
smaller communities in which they were raised and where they attempted to live
and work as adults. Rather, many of these claimants have been the victims of
childhood, domestic, and street violence that interfered with the development of an
effective voice. It is impossible to overstate the importance of the hearing in the
lives of such claimants." Id. (citations omitted).
5. Board of Trustees of the Federal Old Age & Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Fund, Summary Of 2006 Annual Social Security and
Medicare Trust Fund Reports, available at
http://www.ssa.gov./OACT/TRSUM/tr06Summary.pdf.
6. Id. at 1, 3.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
8. E.g., Young v. Bamhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004).
9. Montalvo v. Barnhart, 457 F. Supp. 2d 150 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); Ynocencio v.
Barnhart, 300 F. Supp. 2d 646 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
The losing party may then appeal the district court's substantial
evidence determination.' ° It is taken as axiomatic by the courts of
appeals that this second round of review is performed de novo, with
no deference to the district court's findings, based on the premise that
a district court's substantial evidence determination is a question of
law." In fact, many courts of appeals' decisions make no reference to
the district court's opinion, but refer only to the AL's decision. 12
Simply put, a fundamental problem with the way social security
cases are processed is the treatment of a district court's substantial
evidence determination as a question of law by the circuit courts of
appeals. Indeed, this treatment of substantial evidence determinations
as issues of law has also led to procedural anomalies in the district
courts. Many courts decide social security appeals by means of
summary judgment motions or motions for judgment on the
pleadings, 13 devices that are inappropriate once substantial evidence
review is properly characterized as an issue of fact, as well as for
other reasons.
In many district courts, social security cases are referred to
magistrate judges for report and recommendation. 14 Under this
system, the magistrate judge undertakes the laborious process of
digesting the administrative record and authoring a written opinion,
which is then reviewed by the district court judge who decides
whether to adopt the magistrate judge's opinion. This expends an
additional layer of judicial resources and results in additional delay.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
11. E.g., Milton v. Harris, 616 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1980).
12. E.g., Madrid v. Barnhart, 447 F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 2006).
13. See, e.g., Jt. Ky. Loc. R. 83.11(C)(1)(A) (April 1, 2005) (summary
judgment), available at http://www.kyed.uscourts.gov/rules/Civil Rules-2.pdf;
Dist. Me. Loc. R. 16.3(a)(2)(B) (July 24, 2007) (judgment on the pleadings),
available at http://www.med.uscourts.gov/rules/localrules.pdf.
14. See Morton Denlow, Results of Survey of U.S. Magistrate Judges (2007)
(copy on file with author) (hereinafter "Survey Results"). As part of the process of
writing this article, I surveyed all of the magistrate judges in the federal court
system on several issues related to social security cases. I received 234 responses,
nearly half of all magistrate judges. A copy of the summary of the survey results is
appended to this article. I thank my fellow magistrate judges for their participation
in the survey.
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Judges and scholars alike have criticized this system of review as
wildly inefficient and have proposed legislative change to modify the
system.' 5 This article echoes those concerns, but argues that
Congressional intervention is unnecessary. Rather, the courts of
appeals are the proper agents of change, and need only recognize that
a clearly erroneous standard should be applied to the district court's
substantial evidence determination to achieve similar efficiency
gains.
Part I of this article reviews the current social security disability
determination system from the administrative level through the courts
of appeals. Part II argues that district courts engage in fact finding
when reviewing the record in a social security case, and that courts of
appeals should therefore review the district court's substantial
evidence determination for clear error. Part III engages in a review of
Supreme Court and circuit court case law to determine the origins of
de novo review of substantial evidence determinations, concludes
that only minimal analysis of the issue has been conducted and only
questionable justifications given, and refutes those articulated
reasons. Part IV DISCUSSES practical considerations that favor
deferential review of district court substantial evidence
determinations in the courts of appeals. Part V deals briefly with the
issues of the proper procedural devices to be used in the district
courts and criticizes the use of the report and recommendation
process.
II. THE SOCIAL SECURITY DETERMINATION
AND REVIEW PROCESS
A. Administrative Process
A claimant is entitled to disability benefits if she can prove she is
"under a disability," meaning she is "[unable] to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
15. See Groves v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1998); Paul R. Verkuil &
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security
Disability Cases, 55 Admin. L. Rev. 731 (2003); Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee-Part 11 (1990).
period of not less that 12 months."' 6 The impairment must be
"demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques," and without medical or similar evidence, the
ALJ will not consider an individual to have a disability.' 7
The ALJ uses a five step sequential process to determine whether
a person has a disability. 18 If the ALJ can make a conclusive finding
at any step, it is unnecessary to proceed to the next step. 19 In the first
step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity, and if she is, the ALJ will decide that the
claimant is not disabled.2 ° Second, the ALJ considers the severity of
the claimant's physical or mental impairment and whether it meets
the duration requirement of at least one year.2' Third, the ALJ
considers the severity of the impairment and whether it meets or
equals one of the impairments in the Social Security Administration
"listings."22 Fourth, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual
functional capacity, i.e., what the claimant can do despite her
limitations, and determines whether the claimant has the capacity to
perform her relevant past work.23 Fifth, the ALJ assesses the
claimant's residual functional capacity, as well as her age, education,
and work experience, to determine if the claimant can make an
adjustment to other work.24 The claimant bears the responsibility of
proving the criteria in the first four steps; if she meets this burden, the
Commissioner has the burden of proving the fifth step--i.e., that there
is some other "substantial gainful employment" available to the
claimant.25
If a claimant receives an unfavorable decision from the ALJ, she
must then appeal to the Appeals Council if she wishes to continue the
process. 26 The Appeals Council may grant, deny, or dismiss a request
16.42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), (5) (2000).
18. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 804 (1999).
19. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(4) (2007).
20. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(4)(1) (2007).
21. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(4)(ii) (2007).
22. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(4)(iii) (2007).
23. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(4)(iv) (2007).
24. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(4)(v) (2007).
25. E.g., Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).
26. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (2007).
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to review the ALJ's decision, and if review is granted may issue its
own decision or remand to the ALJ.27 Few claimants are granted
review, but appeal to the Appeals Council is a prerequisite to judicial
review.28
B. District Court Review
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) states that
[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing
to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in
controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by
a civil action ... brought in the district court of the
United States for the judicial district in which the
plaintiff resides.29
This allows a claimant to appeal the Commissioner's decision
denying her benefits in federal district court. As for the procedure
when the claimant files her case in district court, § 405(g) states only
that "[a]s part of the Commissioner's answer [to the claimant's
complaint,] the Commissioner of Social Security shall file a certified
copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon
which the findings and decision complained of are based.
30
After the district court receives the transcript and administrative
record, it "shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with
or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 31 Section 405(g)
sets forth the standard of review of the AL's decision by the district
court:
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Charles T. Hall, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PRACTICE § 4.4
(West 2005).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
30. Id.
31. Id.
The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been
denied by the Commissioner of Social Security or a
decision is rendered under subsection (b) of this
section which is adverse to an individual who was a
party to the hearing before the Commissioner of
Social Security, because of failure of the claimant or
such individual to submit proof in conformity with
any regulation prescribed under subsection (a) of this
section, the court shall review only the question of
conformity with such regulations and the validity of
such regulations. 32
A district court can reverse the Commissioner's final
determination only if the ALJ did not apply the proper legal
standards or the record did not include substantial evidence to
support the ALJ's decision.33 A court reviews the clinical findings
and diagnoses of both treating and examining physicians, the
subjective evidence of pain and disability as testified by the claimant
and by others, and the claimant's work history, education level, and
age.34 Using these evidentiary sources as guidelines, the district court
must review the entire record to see if it contains substantial evidence
supporting the agency's decision, but the court cannot decide facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that
of the ALJ.35 In his opinion, the ALJ must, at some minimal level,
articulate his analysis of the presented evidence if the record contains
evidence that conflicts with the ALJ's opinion. 36 The decision of the
ALJ must be based on consideration of all relevant evidence, and the
reasons for his conclusions must be stated in a manner sufficient to
permit an informed review. 3
7
32. Id.
33. Id.; see Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 368 (1946).
34. E.g., Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457,462 (5th Cir. 2005).
35. E.g., Young v. Bamhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004).
36. E.g., Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1998).
37. Id.
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The amount of evidence the courts require to support the AL's
conclusion is "more than a mere scintilla" but less than the
"preponderance of evidence."38 Substantial evidence is evidence that
"a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the]
conclusion." 39 Even if the reviewing court would reach an opposite
conclusion in a de novo review of the case, the court cannot overturn
the AL's decision if substantial evidence supports it.4" The court
must look at the entire record of proceedings and examine the
evidence favoring the position of the claimant and the evidence
rejecting that position.4' The court's review of the record and its
determination of the substantiality of the evidence must take into
account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. 42 The
only way the district court "can determine if the entire record was
taken into consideration is for the district court to evaluate in detail
the evidence it used in making its decision and how any contradictory
evidence balances out."
43
C. Procedures Used for District Court Review
District courts use a variety of procedural devices to review social
security decisions. Summary judgment is the most common.4 In one
practitioner's guide, for example, the author states, "[a]fter the
government files the administrative record of the case the burden is
upon the claimant's attorney to file a motion for summary
38. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
39. Id.
40. E.g., Johnson v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 1067, 1070-71 (8th Cir. 2004).
41. E.g., Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006).
42. E.g., McCrea v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 2004).
43. Wilcutts v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir. 1998).
44. Hamilton v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv. of U.S., 961 F.2d 1495, 1502
(10th Cir. 1992) (permitting use of summary judgment); Milton v. Harris, 616 F.2d
968, 975 (7th Cir. 1980) (summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff does not
challenge the completeness of the record); Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758 (9th
Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Califano, 434 F.Supp. 302, 310 (D. Md. 1977) (whether
social security benefits claim is supported by substantial evidence is a legal
question to "which summary judgment procedure is particularly applicable");
Harvey L. Mccormick, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES, § 732 at 308
(4th ed. 1991) (stating majority rule).
judgment. '' 45 Only the D.C. Circuit has expressly told lower courts
not to use summary judgment in social security cases:
This case is before us on an appeal of a summary
judgment in favor of appellee, and we think it starkly
illustrates the impropriety of using summary judgment
in deciding a case under the Social Security Act. In
almost every case brought in district court under the
Act, the issue before the court is the substantiality of
the evidence upon which the Secretary based his
findings of fact. The Act directs the court to enter its
judgment upon the pleadings and the transcript of the
record. There is not room, as is normally the case in a
motion for summary judgment, for consideration of
depositions and interrogatories in order to determine
whether any dispute of fact exists, and if so whether it
is bona fide. If the case is one that involves the taking
of additional evidence for any reason, the district court
is obliged to obtain an enhancement or revision of the
record by way of remand to the Secretary. Thus, the
court should more correctly enter either a judgment on
the pleadings, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), or an order pursuant
to a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1). 46
The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all held that
summary judgment is an acceptable procedure to decide the case
without requiring its use.47
The remaining circuits use a variety of procedural devices to
bring the case before the court for a final judgment. Besides summary
judgment, the parties might file a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), 48 a motion to
45. Charles T. Hall, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PRACTICE § 4:14 (West
2005).
46. Igonia v. Califano, 568 F.2d 1383, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
47. Pliley v. Sullivan, 892 F.2d 35, 37 (6th Cir. 1989); Lovett v. Schweiker,
667 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1981); Milton v. Harris, 616 F.2d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 1980);
Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1972).
48. E.g., Santiago v. Barnhart, 441 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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affirm or reverse the administrative court's decision,49 or a motion to
remand to the AL.5 Some courts simply require a complaint and
answer with briefs in support and no motions.5'
Some district courts have dealt with this lack of firm procedural
direction by implementing local rules, such as requiring the plaintiff
to move for summary judgment within thirty days of the
Commissioner's answer;52 permitting only initial pleadings and
briefs; 53 entering judgment on the pleadings after oral argument;54
requiring both parties to move for summary judgment; 55 or requiring
the plaintiff to file a "Motion for Order Reversing Decision of the
Commissioner or for Other Relief' within thirty days of the answer.56
D. Circuit Court Review
Either the Commissioner or the claimant may appeal an adverse
judgment in the district court to the circuit court of appeals. 57 Most
circuit courts explicitly state that the standard is a de novo review,58
49. E.g., Kratman v. Barnhart, 436 F. Supp. 2d 300, 302 (D.Mass. 2006).
50. E.g., Justice v. Barnhart, 431 F. Supp. 2d 617, 618 (W.D.Va. 2006).
51. Survey Results, supra note 14.
52. E. DIST. KY. R. 83.1 l(c)(1)(A) (2006).
53. KAN. DIST. R. 83.7(d) (2006).
54. ME. DIST. R. 16.3(a)(2)(B) (2006).
55. N. DIST. TEX. R. 9.1(b) (2006); C.D. Ill. R. 8.1 (2006).
56. P.R. DIST. R. 9(b) (2006).
57. E.g., Sanchez v. Barnhart, 467 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 2006).
58. Pichette v. Barnhart, 2006 WL 1697524, at *2 (11th Cir. 2006) ("We
review de novo the district court's determination on whether remand to the
Commissioner is necessary based on new evidence."); Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 464
F.3d 944, 947 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We review de novo the decision of the district court
affirming the decision of the AU."); Choate v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d 865, 869 (8th
Cir. 2006) ("We review de novo the district court's decision upholding the denial of
benefits, and affirm if substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the
outcome."); Nelson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2006 WL 2472910, at *6 (6th Cir.
2006) ("We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment.");
Deleon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2006 WL 2351547, at *3 (3d Cir. 2006) ("We
review the District Court's decision de novo."); Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377,
384 (2d Cir. 2004) ("When reviewing the district court's determination as to the
final decision of the Commissioner [w]e review the administrative record de novo,
using the same standard applied by the district court." (internal quotation marks
removed)); Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Our review of a
meaning that the court of appeals reviews de novo the question of
whether the AL's opinion is supported by substantial evidence (and
not meaning de novo review of whether the claimant is disabled).
The remaining circuits, while not stating that review is de novo,
apply an obviously de novo review in practice. They ignore the
district court opinion, skip directly to the AL's opinion and the full
administrative record, and decide anew whether the AL's opinion is
supported by substantial evidence. 59 De novo review is applied
regardless of the procedural device used in the district court.6°
III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REVIEW Is A FACT-FINDING PROCESS
A. Description of Substantial Evidence Review in Practice
A logical place to start the analysis is with a description of my
own process for reviewing social security decisions. I am instructed
by the Seventh Circuit to consider the entire record, not merely the
evidence cited by the ALJ, when I make my decision. Therefore,
after reading the briefs and the AL's decision, I begin by reading the
district court's decision to affirm or reverse a final decision of the Commissioner is
de novo and we use the same standard to review the correctness of the
Commissioner's decision as does the district court.").
59. Cain v. Barnhart, 2006 WL 2311114, at *1 (5th Cir. 2006) ("We review the
Commissioner's decision to deny benefits for substantial evidence and application
of the proper legal standards."); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734 -35 (7th
Cir. 2006) ("Although we perform a de novo review of the AL's conclusions of
law, our review of the ALJ's factual determinations is deferential. We will affirm
the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence." (internal quotes and
citations removed)); Madrid v. Bamhart, 447 F.3d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 2006)
("[W]e review the AL's decision only to determine whether the correct legal
standards were applied and whether the factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence in the record."); Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th
Cir. 2005) ("Under the Social Security Act, [a reviewing court] must uphold the
factual findings of the [ALJ] if they are supported by substantial evidence and were
reached through application of the correct legal standard."); Butler v. Barnhart, 353
F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("[W]e assess only whether the AL's finding that
she is not is based on substantial evidence and a correct application of the law.").
60. See generally, Deleon, 2006 WL 2351547; Cain, 2006 WL 2311114;
Prochaska, 454 F.3d 731; Nelson, 2006 WL 2472910; Choate, 457 F.3d 865;
Lounsburry, 464 F.3d 944; Madrid, 447 F.3d 788; Pichette, 2006 WL 1697524;
Johnson, 434 F.3d 650; Butler, 353 F.3d 992; Butts, 388 F.3d 377; Seavy, 276 F.3d
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administrative record in its entirety. As I go, I flag any evidence that
I believe to be relevant to the disability determination. I then process
all of this evidence, consider how it all fits together and how some
pieces support, contradict, or give context to other pieces. Finally, I
write a statement of facts that reviews all of the evidence that may
implicate the substantial evidence determination, pro or con. It is
inevitably of much greater length and depth than what is found in the
AL's opinion.61
There should be no question that what I have just described is
fact-finding. Fact-finding is, at its heart, the process of focusing a
mass of evidence into a coherent story by determining what is
relevant and to what extent it is relevant. Certainly, the universe of
facts in a social security appeal is closed by the administrative record,
but this is no different than a bench trial, where the universe of facts
is closed by what the parties have chosen to introduce into evidence.
In both instances, a judge's critical eye and professional experience
are used to sift and sort facts and to eventually make findings of fact.
As discussed below in Section III, current appellate court case
law is uniformly rooted in a view of the substantial evidence review
process in the district courts as one of reviewing the AL's decision to
see if it measures up to a particular standard. The focus is on the
AL's decision and its legal "status." A different, and I believe more
realistic, view is that the district court is itself answering the same
fact question as the AUD but using a deferential evidentiary standard.
Because the district court is deciding a question of fact, the courts of
appeals should apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to the
district court's decision.
Say, for example, the ALJ concluded the claimant could stand for
seven of eight hours in a work-day. The AU cited the testimony of
the medical expert but did not mention that five treating physicians
restricted the claimant to standing no more than four hours per day,
nor the definitive medical manual on treatment of the impairment that
strongly recommends the same restriction. The district court is not
reviewing the ALJ's conclusion for legal error so much as making an
independent decision regarding the factual issue of whether
substantial evidence supports the finding that the claimant can stand
61. See, e.g., Ynocencio v. Bamhart, 300 F. Supp. 2d 646 (N.D. I1. 2004). See
also e.g., Montalvo v. Barnhart, 457 F. Supp. 2d 150 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
for seven of eight hours in a work-day. But, the district court does not
make this factual determination as if the issue were before it on a
bench trial. Rather, the district court asks whether there is a
reasonable evidentiary basis for (as opposed to a preponderance of
the evidence supporting) a conclusion that as a matter of fact the
claimant does not need the restriction. The distinction is subtle, but at
its core, what is at issue is a fact (can the claimant stand for more
than an hour a day) and not a legal conclusion.
I recently surveyed all of the magistrate judges in the federal
court system and asked whether they felt that they were deciding a
question of fact when reviewing social security records for
substantial evidence. Nearly half of the approximately 500 magistrate
judges responded. I asked:
In reviewing the record in a social security case to determine
whether substantial evidence supports the decision of the ALJ, do
you believe you are deciding a question of fact? (I am interested in
how you would characterize what you are doing based on your
experience in reviewing the administrative record, not necessarily the
way your court of appeals characterizes the issue.) 62
Approximately 30% answered that they were deciding a question
of fact, with 70% answering question of law.63 While I was at first
surprised to learn that more judges characterized the issue as a
question of law, the fact that 30% described the process as a question
of fact despite uniform appellate court description of the issue as one
of law, demonstrates a clear disconnect between the district and
circuit courts and reveals the need for deeper analysis.
B. Comparison to a Trial on the Papers
A Rule 52(a) trial on the papers is a bench trial conducted without
live witnesses on the basis of a purely documentary record. 64 It
resembles review of social security decisions in that the record before
62. Survey Results, supra note 14.
63. Survey Results, supra note 14. About a dozen judges added comments
characterizing the process as a mixed question of law and fact. Id.
64. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985); Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155 F.3d 140 (1998); Morton Denlow, Trial On The
Papers: An Alternative To Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment, THE FEDERAL
LAWYER, August 1999, at 30.
SDrina 2008 Substantial Evidence Review
42 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-1
the district court consists only of written evidence. The two processes
differ only in the evidentiary standard to be applied to the written
record--preponderance of the evidence in a trial on the papers and
substantial evidence in a social security case. The difference in
standard does not change the underlying process or make substantial
evidence review any less a question of fact.
Rule 52(a) states, "[flindings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given the opportunity of the trial
court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." 65 Thus, even in a
trial on the papers, which involves only documentary evidence, the
courts of appeals review the district courts' factual findings for clear
error, and not de novo.
While the plain text of Rule 52(a) mandates clearly erroneous
review, some courts of appeals, for a time, subjected factual findings
based solely on documentary evidence to de novo review.66 One
commentator has described appellate court case law on the issue
during that time as "indescribably confused," despite "the clear
language of the rule, two Notes by the Advisory Committee, and
pointed expressions from the Supreme Court."67
De novo review of Rule 52(a) findings of fact based on
documentary evidence has long been rejected. The Advisory
Committee Notes to the 1985 amendments to Rule 52(a) state:
The principal argument advanced in favor of a more
searching appellate review of findings by the district
court based solely on documentary evidence is that the
rationale of Rule 52(a) does not apply when the
findings do not rest on the trial court's assessment of
credibility of the witnesses but on an evaluation of
documentary proof and the drawing of inferences
from it, thus eliminating the need for any special
deference to the trial court's findings. These
considerations are outweighed by the public interest in
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
66. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985); FED. R.
CIV. P. 52(a) advisory committee's notes (1985 Amendment).
67. Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2587 (West
2007).
the stability and judicial economy that would be
promoted by recognizing that the trial court, not the
appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the facts. To
permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the
fact-finding function would tend to undermine the
legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants,
multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of
some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial
authority. 6
8
Similar reasoning was used by the Supreme Court:
The rationale for deference to the original finder of
fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge's
position to make determinations of credibility. The
trial judge's major role is the determination of fact,
and with experience in fulfilling that role comes
expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the
court of appeals would very likely contribute only
negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a
huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. In
addition, the parties to a case on appeal have already
been forced to concentrate their energies and
resources on persuading the trial judge that their
account of the facts is the correct one; requiring them
to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is
requiring too much. As the Court has stated in a
different context, the trial on the merits should be the
main event rather than a tryout on the road. For these
reasons, review of factual findings under the clearly-
erroneous standard-with its deference to the trier of
fact-is the rule, not the exception. 69
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) advisory committee's notes (1985 Amendment).
69. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). See also Wright & Miller, supra note 67 at § 2587 ("This construction of
the rule [clearly erroneous review of Rule 52(a) findings of fact based on
documentary evidence] was required by the language of the rule itself, by the
Advisory Committee Notes to the rule, and by the decisions of the Supreme Court.
It was required even more clearly by the essential nature and function of trial courts
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While section 405(g) lacks the same textual grounding for clearly
erroneous review, the reasoning used by the Advisory Committee and
the Supreme Court equally applies to substantial evidence review.
Redundant review of substantial evidence decisions by the courts of
appeals does not make for sound judicial economy and damages the
legitimacy of the district courts. District courts have greater
experience in reviewing social security decisions for substantial
evidence, and another layer of identical judicial review adds little by
way of accuracy and needlessly expends judicial resources. 70
Finally, section 405(g) of the Social Security Act states: "The
judgment of the [district] court shall be final except that it shall be
subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil
actions. 7 1 Because the Act does not specify the procedural device to
be used to review social security decisions in the district court, nor
the standard of review on appeal in the circuit courts, what
constitutes "the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions"
must be determined by analogy. The proper analogy is to a Rule
52(a) trial on the papers.
It may be that district courts should make findings of fact and
conclusions of law under Rule 52(a) when deciding social security
cases. In this way, the court would make a finding as to whether
substantial evidence exists to support the AL's finding and identify
the factual basis. The court could then discuss the legal issues. As
discussed below in Section III, appellate courts have first
characterized substantial evidence review as an issue of law and then
decided that summary judgment is an appropriate procedure, not the
other way around. Therefore, it is unlikely that changing the
procedure at the district court level will force a change in the
standard of review at the courts of appeals level. Further, Rule 52(a)
decisions involve both findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
conclusions of law are subject to de novo review. Therefore, the legal
issues raised in a social security appeal would still be subject to de
as distinguished from appellate courts. Even in instances in which an appellate
court is in as good a position to decide as the trial court, it should not disregard the
trial court's finding, because to do so impairs confidence in the trial courts and
multiplies appeals with attendant expense and delay.").
70. See Section V, infra, for discussion of judicial economy and trial vs.
appellate court roles.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006).
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novo review. Thus, change relies on recognition by courts of appeals
of substantial evidence review as a factual issue, using Rule 52(a) as
an analogy, and not on a change in district court procedures.
C. Comparison to Other Administrative Law Contexts
In many administrative contexts, appeals are taken directly to the
courts of appeals, with subsequent appeal taken to the Supreme
Court.72 Therefore, it is helpful to draw an analogy to the manner in
which the Supreme Court reviews courts of appeals substantial
evidence decisions in other administrative contexts. That review is,
properly, deferential.
For example, National Labor Relations Board decisions are
appealed directly to the courts of appeals under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).73 The APA authorizes the courts of appeals,
among other things, to review administrative agency decisions for
substantial evidence.74 In this context, the Supreme Court gives
deference to decisions made by the courts of appeals by seldom
reviewing the application of the substantial evidence standard.75 The
Court has acknowledged that "Congress charged the courts of
appeals, not this Court, with the normal and primary responsibility
for reviewing the conclusions of the [administrative agency]. ''76
Furthermore, the Supreme Court "is not the place to review a conflict
of evidence nor to reverse a court of appeals because were [the
Supreme Court] in its place we would find the record tilting one way
rather than the other. '77 The Supreme Court will only intervene with
the court of appeals' decision in the "rare instance when the standard
appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied. 78 If
72. See Koch, ADMIISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 8.13 (West 2d ed.)
(2006).
73. E.g., Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409-10
(1952).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(E) (2000).
75. Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 491
(1951).
76. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 343 U.S. at 409-10.
77. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v.
Pittsburg S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498, 503 (1951)).
78. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 491.
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review by the courts of appeals in social security cases were properly
analogized to Supreme Court review of courts of appeals decisions
regarding substantial evidence, courts of appeals would apply a
similarly deferential standard of review to district court substantial
evidence conclusions.
IV. COURTS OF APPEALS HAVE ERRONEOUSLY SUBJECTED
DISTRICT COURT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DETERMINATIONS
To DE Novo REVIEW
The appellate practice of reviewing a district court substantial
evidence decision de novo on summary judgment initially motivated
the writing of this article. Although it is common practice for an
appellate court to review a summary judgment case de novo,79
perhaps a Rule 52 trial on the papers or another device would trigger
a more deferential review. Unfortunately, this puts the cart before the
horse: appellate courts addressing the issue have decided first that
substantial evidence review is a legal issue, and therefore (in most
circuits) that summary judgment is an appropriate procedural device.
Further, as discussed in Section I, regardless of the procedural device
used, circuit courts have uniformly applied a de novo review to
substantial evidence determinations.
A. Reasons for Appellate Court Treatment of Substantial Evidence
Decisions as a Matter of Law
As to the standard of review the appellate courts should apply to
district court substantial evidence determinations, the Social Security
Act simply states "[t]he judgment of the court shall be final except
that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in
other civil actions."80 Given the uniform appellate treatment of the
issue as one of law and the massive judicial effort required for de
novo review on appeal, one would expect to find a Supreme Court-
decision holding that substantial evidence review is an issue of law.
However, there is no such Supreme Court decision, and the courts of
79. See, e.g., Tr. of S. Cal. Bakery Drivers Sec. Fund v. Middleton, 474 F.3d
642, 645 (9th Cir. 2007).
80. 42 U.S.C. 405(g) (2006).
appeals that have addressed the issue with any depth have relied on
unconvincing logic.
The Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance or analysis
on the issue of whether substantial evidence review of a social
security disability decision, or of an agency decision under the APA,
is a question of law to be decided de novo on appeal or a question of
fact to be reviewed under a deferential standard. Rather, the Court
has offered conflicting treatment of the issue-at times implying that
substantial evidence review is a question of fact subject to deferential
review 81 and at times stating that the issue is one of law subject to de
novo review.8 2 None of these cases specifically addressed the issue in
any detail.
Circuit court case law, while often expressly holding that review
is de novo, offers little analysis supporting that conclusion. In 1980,
the Seventh Circuit in Milton v. Harris addressed the propriety of
summary judgment as the device for deciding social security
appeals.83 In doing so, the court looked in part, to whether the
substantial evidence question was one of law or fact, as summary
81. See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S.
775, 795 n.13 (1990) ("[Dissent's] argument is founded on the premise that the
issue before us is the factual question whether substantial evidence supports the
Board's finding .... "); Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412,
417-21 (1951) ("We sustain the Commissioner's power to reject this position and
hold valid the challenged order, buttressed as it is by the District Court's approval..
• . We cannot say the District Court misapprehended or misapplied the proper
judicial standard in holding that the Commission's order was not arbitrary or
against the public interest as a matter of law .... We have considered other minor
contentions made by RCA but are satisfied with the way the District Court
disposed of them."); Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.., 340
U.S. 474, 491 (1951) ("Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial
evidence to support agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the
keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to
be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or
grossly misapplied.").
82. See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163, 170
(1943) ("With respect to the amount set as a maximum [by the Interstate
Commerce Commission] the only question of law which can arise is whether there
is substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding."); Co. Nat'l Bank v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 305 U.S. 23, 25 (1938) ("[W]hether there is
substantial evidence to support a finding [by the Commissioner] is a question of
law.").
83. Milton v. Harris, 616 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1980).
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judgment would not be appropriate if the district court was required
to resolve an issue of fact.84 While the courts of appeals universally
treat substantial evidence review as an issue of law subject to de novo
review, Milton is the only court of appeals case to discuss the issue
with any level of depth, and is therefore an appropriate place to
begin.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the district court must
"carefully peruse the proceedings below,"'85 but treated the record
itself as uncontested, summarily rejecting as "mere sophistry" the
argument that the existence of substantial evidence in the record is
itself an issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment.86 The
remainder of the court's discussion on the summary judgment issue
involved the depth of analysis required by the district court and
whether that depth could be achieved through summary judgment,
concluding that it could.87 Yet, whether the appropriate depth of
analysis could be achieved through summary judgment is unrelated
to whether the issue before the court is one of law or fact or what
standard of review applies on appeal.
In reaching its conclusion in Milton, the Seventh Circuit relied on
Beane v. Richardson,88 a Ninth Circuit case. While Milton provided
at least its "mere sophistry" footnote in justifying the treatment of
substantial evidence as a matter of law, Beane was even more
cursory. The extent of Beane's treatment of the issue is as follow:
The judicial determination of this administrative finding [(the
AU's findings of fact and whether they were supported by substantial
evidence)] presents only an issue of law and not a question of fact.
Dredge Corporation v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1964). It
is therefore a proper issue to raise by summary judgment.89
The search for a rigorous analysis of the issue turns therefore to
Dredge. Dredge was a 1964 Ninth Circuit case involving judicial
review of an administrative decision by the Bureau of Land
84. Id. at 975.
85. Id. at 976 n.10.
86. Id. at 975, 976 n.10.
87. Id. at 975.
88. Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758.
89. Id. at 759.
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Management pursuant to the APA.90 The APA contains a substantial
evidence review provision very similar to the Social Security Act,
and the plaintiffs in Dredge challenged the Bureau's decision on
those grounds. 91 The court concluded that the presence of substantial
evidence was a question of law, making summary judgment
appropriate, 92 and cited Marion County Co-op Ass'n v. Carnation
Co.
9 3
Marion was an antitrust case that involved neither the substantial
evidence standard nor judicial review of an administrative decision.94
Rather, the relevant issues in Marion were the standards for summary
judgment, and the court noted in its discussion that "the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence raises an issue of law."95 That phrase
appears to be what Dredge relied upon for its conclusion that
substantial evidence review is a question of law, and seems to be the
genesis of the conclusion that substantial evidence review in social
security cases is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo.
In addition to Beane, Milton cited Moore's Federal Practice as
support for the conclusion that substantial evidence review is an issue
of law.96 The justification given in Moore's is as follows:
In reviewing agency action [for substantial evidence]
no de novo fact findings may be made by the district
court. Thus, the court does not find facts, rather it
examines the agency record to determine whether the
state of facts meets the particular standard of review--
a process that involves only a question of law, not
fact.97
90. Dredge v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 462.
93. Marion County Co-op Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 214 F.2d 557 (8th Cir.
1954).
94. Id. at 558.
95. Id. at 560.
96. Milton v. Harris, 616 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1980).
97. 11 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56App.200(6) n.25 (2005).
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It seems, therefore, that only two explanations have been given as
to why substantial evidence review is an issue of law, not fact: (1) the
standard is analogous to determining the sufficiency of evidence as in
a traditional motion for summary judgment, and (2) no de novo fact
finding is performed by the trial court. As discussed below in Section
III.C, those explanations are based on misunderstandings about the
nature of substantial evidence review.
B. Nickol and the Short-Lived Tenth Circuit Deferential Review
At one point, it appeared that at least one circuit would treat
substantial evidence review as an issue of fact. In 1974, the Tenth
Circuit in Nickol v. United States addressed the propriety of summary
judgment in an APA substantial evidence case arising from a
Department of the Interior, Board of Land Appeals decision.98 The
court noted the numerous cases interpreting the question as one of
law, including Beane and Dredge, but reached the conclusion that the
issue in the case was actually one of fact, precluding summary
judgment:
A judicial determination of whether 'substantial
evidence' can be found in the record to support the
administrative conclusion necessarily involves a fact
finding which in turn determines whether the agency's
action must be upheld. The issues in such a judicial
review are, by definition and in substance, genuine
issues as to material fact .... 9
The court noted that the administrative record contained "detailed
testimony as to a variety of particular facts, conditions, and events....
These are in great part divergent and conflicting."' 10 This required
the district court to examine [the] facts in the record, evaluate the
conflicts, and to then make a determination therefrom whether the
facts supported the several elements which made up the ultimate
administrative decision . . . .For the district court to reach its
98. Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974).
99. Id. (emphasis in original).
100. Id.
conclusion requires [the] evaluation of testimony, resolution of
conflicts, and a general examination of facts which would occur had
the matter been 'tried' in that court. The statutory standards and
presumptions are different in degree only because the case has
already been 'tried' before someone else.
10
'
Finally, the court turned to the review on appeal:
For us to give it a meaningful review in accordance
with the usual standards and practices applied by an
appellate court, we must know how the trial court
evaluated the conflicting facts and how it reached its
determination as of the ultimate facts to which the law
was applied. We again have to make a determination
as to substantial evidence, but to do this and to give
the proper consideration to the action of the district
court, we must know how it reached its conclusions.
We could, of course, go through the record again and
make a de novo determination. Thus the case would
receive two separate and unrelated reviews. However,
this is not in accord with proper appellate review.
When the decision is based on conflicting facts, there
need be some indication by the trial court as to how it
arrived at its conclusions, and what in its opinion were
the operative facts for which it found the substantial
evidence.' 0 2
A year later, the Tenth Circuit applied the holding in Nickol to a
Social Security case in Mandrell v. Weinberger.10 3 The appellate
court's review of the district court in Mandrell showed the sort of
deference one would expect in reviewing findings of fact below. The
101. Id. at 1391.
102. Id.
103. Mandrell v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1975). Because the
district court in Mandrell rendered its decision prior to Nickol, and because the
district court's opinion made clear the facts relied upon by the district court in
concluding that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, the
appellate court overlooked the use of summary judgment. Id. at 1103.
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appellate court's sole discussion of whether the AL's decision was
supported by substantial evidence was this:
Finally, it is alleged that the decision of the Secretary
is not supported by substantial evidence in the
administrative record. The district court carefully and
thoroughly reviewed the disputed facts in the
administrative record and found substantial evidence
to support the Secretary's denial of benefits .... The
operative facts which are supported in the
administrative record by substantial evidence are
summarized in the opinion of the district court, and
this provides this court with a sufficient basis for
review without a complete repetition of the trial
court's action. 104
The appellate court did not review the record evidence again de
novo to determine whether substantial evidence existed.
Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit eventually reverted to true de novo
review of the substantial evidence issue. In 1992, Senior District
Judge Kane, sitting by designation with the Tenth Circuit, noted the
disintegration of Nickol in his concurring opinion in Hamilton v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services. 105 Judge Kane's criticism was
of the common practice among Tenth Circuit district courts to use
summary judgment in social security review cases despite the
guidance of Nickol. 106 Judge Kane's concern, however, related to the
depth of treatment in the district court phase, and not the standard of
review on appeal to the circuit courts.10 7 Judge Kane preferred that
the district courts use the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
he signed on to a majority opinion that performed a clearly de novo
review of the administrative record to re-decide the substantial
evidence question.'0 8 Current practice in the Tenth Circuit is to
review the district court's decision regarding substantial evidence de
104. Id. at 1103.
105. Hamilton v. Secy of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir.
1992).
106. Id. at 1500-04.
107. Id. at 1503-04.
108. Id. at 1497-1500, 1503-04.
novo, ignoring the district court's decision altogether, and focusing
solely on the administrative record.10 9
C. Refuting the Summary Judgment/Sufficiency of Evidence
Comparison
The first argument for treating substantial evidence review as an
issue of law is by analogy to whether there is sufficient evidence to
deny summary judgment. However, this analogy overlooks a critical
distinction. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the basis for
summary judgment, states that summary judgment is required if the
evidence shows "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 110
Thus, the plain text of Rule 56 dictates that whether there is sufficient
evidence to withstand summary judgment is a question of law.
The same cannot be said of section 405(g), the statutory basis for
substantial evidence review of social security decisions.111 Section
405(g) is silent as to the standard of review of a district court's
substantial evidence decision and does not discuss whether the issue
is one of law or of fact, other than to say that the district court's
judgment "shall be subject to review in the same manner as a
judgment in other civil actions." Because of this important difference
between the texts of Rule 56 and section 405(g), the analogy between
them is inappropriate, and appellate court treatment of summary
judgment should not dictate the standard of review in substantial
evidence decisions.' 12
109. See, e.g., Martinez v. Barnhart, 444 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2006); Madrid v.
Barnhart, 447 F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 2006).
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
111.42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
112. At first glance, it may appear analytically unsound to reject analogy to
Rule 56 on the basis of its textual command that summary judgment be treated as
an issue of law, yet accept analogy to Rule 52 despite its command that review be
done for clear error, a command absent from section 405(g). The important
difference, however, is that analogy to Rule 52 is grounded in the reasons why clear
error applies. The courts relying on analogy to Rule 56 have not discussed the
reasons why summary judgment is treated as an issue of law.
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D. Refuting the "No De Novo Fact Finding" Argument
Appellate courts believe that district courts do not engage in de
novo fact-finding when they review social security decisions. The
origin of this belief is the passage in Moore's Federal Practice cited in
Milton--an assertion made with no cites or critical analysis." 3 On a
superficial level, this is an easy conclusion to reach, in that no new
evidence is produced to the district court. Yet, as discussed above in
Section II.B, substantial evidence review is a fact-finding process
similar to a trial on the papers pursuant to Rule 52(a), and should be
afforded the same deference on appellate review."l 4
V. PRACTICAL REASONS FOR CLEARLY ERRONEOUS REVIEW
Substantial evidence review by district courts is a fact-finding
process similar to a trial on the papers pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a), and should therefore be treated with the same
deferential standard of review on appeal. 1 5 Further, the justifications
given by the courts of appeals for treating substantial evidence
review as an issue of law subject to de novo review rely on erroneous
understandings about the work a trial court performs in undertaking
substantial evidence review of the Commissioner's decisions. In
addition, there are two important practical reasons for giving
deference to the district court's determination: the proper roles of
district and appellate courts, and judicial economy.
A. Trial Court vs. Appellate Court Roles
In counseling on the appropriate standard of review for appellate
courts to apply to any given situation, the Supreme Court has offered
guidance that should instruct the analysis of whether substantial
evidence review is an issue of law or fact, and the appropriate
standard of review of the district court's decision on appeal." 16
Consideration of these factors leads to the conclusion that district
113. Milton v. Harris, 616 F.2d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 1980).
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
115. Id.
116. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
court substantial evidence decisions should be given greater
deference.
The first factor is whether the relevant statute commands a
particular standard of review.117 There is no such command in the
Social Security Act. The second factor is historical tradition.118 There
has been some disagreement among the circuits in the past as to
whether substantial evidence review is a question of law or fact, but
the circuits have for some time now universally treated the issue as
one of law. As this article argues, however, to the extent courts have
historically treated the question as one of law, that treatment has been
erroneous.
Third, an appellate court should consider whether the decision is
one that, "as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question."1 19 De novo treatment of district court substantial evidence
determinations fails to appreciate the proper roles of trial and
appellate courts. As discussed above, the substantial evidence
determination is one of fact, not law. Once that conclusion is reached,
it should be self-evident that the district court, as a superior finder of
fact, possesses greater institutional competence for making the
substantial evidence determination, and its decision should be
reviewed for clear error. Further, district courts have more experience
reviewing social security decisions than the circuit courts. 2 °
No one contends that the Supreme Court or circuit courts should
not establish the broader legal principles governing the Social
Security Act that affect all, or a majority of, the social security cases.
What should be equally apparent, however, is that when it comes to
the nitty-gritty dissection of any particular administrative record to
determine whether substantial evidence supports a particular part of a
117. Id. at 557-58.
118. Id. at 558.
119. Id. at 559-60 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
120. A search of Westlaw in the all circuit courts of appeals database using the
terms "social security" and "substantial evidence" in the year 2006 produces 411
results. The same search in the all district courts database yielded 853. See also
Survey Results, supra note 14 at 9-10 (over 40% of respondents review greater
than twenty Social Security decisions each per year, with many reviewing over
fifty).
Spring 2008 Substantial Evidence Review
56 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-1
particular ALJ's opinion, district courts simply have more experience,
and this expertise should be respected by having appellate courts
apply a deferential standard of review on appeal.
The final factor for deciding the appropriate standard of review is
the practicability or impracticability of fashioning a rule of
decision.121 "Many questions that arise in litigation are not amenable
to regulation by rule because they involve multifarious, fleeting,
special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization .... ,122 In my
experience, I have found that substantial evidence decisions resist
generalization on the appellate level. The courts of appeals have
developed some doctrines that are essential in reviewing social
security denials for substantial evidence, such as the "treating
physician rule," under which evidence from a treating physician is
entitled to great weight. 123 But, in the vast majority of cases in which
substantial evidence is an issue, a district court judge is faced with a
unique combination of facts that can be resolved only through
judicial experience and exercise of discretion. In these instances,
there is little guidance that the courts of appeals can provide by way
of a generalized rule.
Together, these factors suggest that substantial evidence
determinations are more properly issues for the district courts to
decide, with a deferential standard of review on appeal.
B. Judicial Efficiency
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee, commissioned by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at the direction of Congress,
completed a fifteen-month study on efficiency in the federal
courts. 124 The report was prompted by "mounting public and
professional concern with the federal courts' congestion, delay,
121. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 561-62 (citing Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial
Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635
(1971)).
122. Id. at 561-62 (quoting Rosenberg at 662).
123. See, e.g., Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 376 (7th Cir. 2006). The
treating physician rule has been codified into Social Security regulations. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2) (2007).
124. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, Part H (1990) [hereinafter
Federal Courts Study].
expense, and expansion," and offered recommendations on a wide
variety of issues.125
The report specifically addressed efficiency issues created by the
two-tier system of review applied to social security disability
claims. 2 6 It described the (still) current two-tiered review process as
"cumbersome and duplicative," noting that the courts of appeals re-
perform the same function performed by the district courts. 12 7
The report called for creation of an Article I Court of Disability
Claims to hear first-tier review of disability decisions, with
subsequent review in the circuit courts "limited to pure issues of
law. ' 128 The Committee recommended this change because it
believed that the "principal issues in most Social Security disability
cases are factual and technical," and that a new Article I court could
"provide a more thorough and expert examination of the facts than
federal district courts can provide."' 29 The report also recommended
that appeals to the circuit courts be limited to "constitutional claims
and questions of law," which would not include "[d]ecisions about
the sufficiency of evidence.'
131
The report recognized that the current system is grossly
inefficient,13' and acknowledged that factual issues predominate
social security cases. The report may be correct that an "expert"
Article I court might be superior to the district courts in evaluating
administrative decisions for substantial evidence, but that should also
mean that district courts, by virtue of their greater experience with
fact issues, are superior to appellate courts in making these
evaluations. Even in the absence of creation of a specialized court-a
125. Id.
126. Federal Courts Study, supra note 124, at 55-59. More detailed discussion
is also found in Part III of the Report at 285-352.
127. Id. at 55-56.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 56.
130. Id.
131. See also Groves v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1998) ("But the
district judge's error is irrelevant because our review of his decision is de novo,
which means that we review the decision by the administrative law judge without
giving any deference to the district judge's review of that decision. This raises the
question why there should be two tiers of review of identical scope of the
administrative decision, but that is a question properly addressed to Congress rather
than to the courts.") (internal citations omitted).
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change that would require congressional action-efficiency gains
could be had if appellate courts simply recognized that substantial
evidence review is a factual inquiry subject to a clearly erroneous
standard of review. The more deferential standard would reduce the
amount of appellate resources exhausted in substantial evidence
review, and would likely discourage some appeals because the
likelihood of success would be much lower. 132
Several members of the Committee dissented from the social
security recommendation. The dissent favored retention of district
court review but would limit circuit court review to questions of law
only, which would not include substantial evidence review.1 33 In my
opinion, the dissenting view is correct, but I believe reform would be
unnecessary if courts of appeals simply reconsider whether
substantial evidence review is really an issue of law. Given the
potential efficiencies at stake, courts of appeals or the Supreme Court
should have a compelling reason to give the issue further thought.
VI. FINAL THOUGHTS ON PROCEDURES
A. The Report and Recommendation Process is Inefficient
and Should be Avoided
Over 50% of the magistrate judges participating in the survey
related to this article decide 75% or more of their social security
cases on a report and recommendation basis, with nearly 40% of
judges deciding over 90% of their cases in that way. This is not an
efficient use of judicial resources because the work of the first judge
in reviewing the administrative record for substantial evidence will
132. In many districts, social security decisions are made by magistrate judges
on a "Report and Recommendation" basis, which means that a federal magistrate
judge writes an opinion that is reviewed by the district court judge, who either
adopts the opinion or not. See Survey Results, supra note 15; 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) (2000); Montalvo v. Barnhart, 457 F. Supp. 2d 150 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)
(adopting magistrate judge's report); Reece v. Barnhart, 414 F. Supp. 2d 555
(D.S.C. 2006) (rejecting magistrate judge's recommendation after conducting de
novo review of the record). In these circumstances, judicial inefficiency is even
greater, as an additional layer ofjudicial review is imposed.
133. Federal Courts Study, supra note 124 at 58.
be duplicated at least once, and twice if the district court's opinion is
appealed to the circuit court.
Magistrate judges have played an important part in processing the
enormous volume of social security cases brought to federal court.
There is a more efficient way to contribute, however. If the parties
agree to consent to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate
Judge, the entire case is heard before the magistrate judge, whose
orders are appealed directly to the circuit court.134
To the extent district judges wish to utilize the magistrate judges
in their district for social security cases, they should more actively
encourage claimants and the government to consent to the magistrate
judge's jurisdiction or else keep the case for decision if the parties do
not consent. Social Security litigants should seriously consider the,
two major benefits associated with consenting to magistrate judge
jurisdiction.' 35 First, the case will be decided more quickly because
an additional layer of review will be eliminated. Second, in many
districts, magistrate judges handle a great number of social security
cases, with some individual magistrate judges handling fifty cases or
more per year,'36 which allows for a greater degree of expertise.
B. Proper District Court Procedures
As discussed above in Section I, the following procedural devices
are used to decide social security cases in federal court: (1) motions
for summary judgment; (2) motions for judgment on the pleadings;
(3) motions to affirm, reverse, or remand the Commissioner; and (4)
briefs on each side with no motions. This article has also raised the
possibility of a Rule 52(a) trial on the papers. While the actual review
process does not seem to vary depending on the procedures used,137
some procedures are a poor fit for the review process and contribute
to needless confusion.
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
135. I was surprised to see many survey respondents' comments indicating that
either the government or plaintiffs bar in their jurisdiction have a regular practice
of not consenting. Survey Results, supra note 15.
136. See Survey Results, supra note 14. Forty percent of magistrate judges
who responded handled more than twenty Social Security cases per year. Id.
137. See Section II. C.
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Summary judgment simply makes no sense in deciding social
security cases. The usual summary judgment standards of absence of
issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law
do not apply because almost all social security disability decisions
involve questions of fact before the administrative law judge.
Further, Rule 56 permits the introduction of affidavits and other
supplemental materials that are not permitted in social security cases.
Summary judgment also permits a nondecision where a question of
fact is found, whereas social security review requires a decision to
either affirm, reverse, or remand. For these reasons and others,
summary judgment has been widely criticized as a vehicle for
deciding social security cases. 138
Motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) are also
improper. Rule 12(c) states that "if ... matters outside the pleading
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment. ' 139 Because the administrative
record serves as the basis for deciding a social security case, matters
outside the pleadings are considered and the court is simply left with
summary judgment.
Motions to affirm, reverse, or remand appear appropriate because
they capture the options contained in 42 U.S.C. section 405(g).
Because these motions accurately describe the relief sought they do
not generate any procedural confusion.
The practice of simply filing briefs in support of each side's
position is the simplest. This practice is analogous to the process used
by circuit courts under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15 for
review of agency decisions directly to the courts of appeals. 140
Finally, a trial on the papers under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) offers an interesting option. It has the advantage of
recognizing the factual nature of the substantial evidence inquiry by
permitting the trial court judge to make findings of fact based on the
paper record. Because this procedure is not widely used, however, it
might create confusion as administrative review has traditionally not
required Rule 52(a) findings of fact and conclusions of law.
138. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495,
1500-04 (10th Cir. 1992) (Kane, J., dissenting), and cases cited therein.
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).
140. FED. R. APP. P. 15. See, e.g., Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir., Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't of Labor, 519 U.S. 248 (1997).
VII. CONCLUSION
It has been taken for granted, with little critical analysis, that
district court review of social security decisions is a legal issue
subject to de novo review on appeal. This treatment comes at a great
cost to the judicial system and is analytically wrong. The time has
come to take a closer look at the issue and conclude that substantial
evidence review in social security cases is a question of fact subject
to clearly erroneous review by the courts of appeals. In addition,
district courts should consider encouraging parties to consent to
magistrate judges' jurisdiction rather than referring cases for reports
and recommendations, and should adopt a simple and uniform local
rule to bring about the efficient disposition of these important cases.
APPENDIX A - RESULTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY SURVEY
1. In reviewing the record in a social security case to determine
whether substantial evidence supports the decision of the ALJ, do
you believe you are deciding a question of fact? (I am interested in
how you would characterize what you are doing based on your
experience in reviewing the administrative record, not necessarily the
way your court of appeals characterizes the issue.)
Total Respondents 222
Yes, I am deciding a question
No, I am deciding a question of law.
30.2% (67 responses)
69.8% (155 responses)
2. What procedural mechanism or mechanisms do the attorneys in
your court use in presenting the Social Security Administration's
decision to you for review? Please check all that apply.
Total Respondents 224
Motions for summary judgment
Motions for judgment on the pleadings
Motions to affirm, reverse, or remand
the decision of the Commissioner
Other (please specify)
*Briefs only/no motions
*Joint stipulations
*Misc.
42.9% (96 responses)
12.1% (27 responses)
35.7% (80 responses)
29.5% (66 responses)
4% (9 responses)
2% (4 responses)
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3. Approximately how many social security cases do you decide
either on consent or by means of report and recommendation in a
typical year?
Total Respondents 230
Zero
1-10
11-20
Over 20
3.9% (9 responses)
23.5% (54 responses)
31.7% (73 responses)
40.8% (94 responses)
4. Approximately what percent of the social security cases you
decide are on consent, and what percent are on report and
recommendation?
Total Respondents 223
90% or more consent
75% consent/25% R&R
50% each
25% consent/75% R&R
90% or more R&R
5. Any comments are appreciated but
provide any comments below.
34.1% (76 responses)
6.3% (14 responses)
8.1% (18 responses)
12.6% (28 responses)
39% (87 responses)
not necessary. Please
Total Respondents 74
Sample answers:
1. Although I answered # 1 that whether there is substantial
evidence is a question of law, it is resolved by an intensive review of
the facts. In all civil litigation, I believe that a careful review of the
facts can often eliminate difficult legal issues. In social security
cases, the question is whether there'are a cluster of fact-findings by
the AU that find support in the record and which, following the
regulations and statute, lead to the conclusion that the claimant is not
disabled.
2. The [district name omitted] has had an explosion in the number
of social security cases in the last few years, contributing to a large
backlog of cases. The social security cases are being filed
approximately one each business day, and the five Magistrate Judges
in this district are getting approximately one new case per week. The
Substantial Evidence Review
court is attempting to address this backlog in various ways, including
assigning extra law clerks to work on pending cases. Recently, the
Clerk has sent consent forms in all pending social security cases.
Thus, there may soon be a larger percentage of consent cases than we
currently have. With respect to your question regarding whether the
court is deciding questions of law or fact, we look at whether correct
legal principles are applied then determine whether substantial
evidence supports the Commissioner's conclusion. Although we are
looking at questions of law, we are also looking at whether the facts
support the conclusion and whether the facts are properly stated. We
do not re-weigh the evidence, however.
3. This kind of case does not fit comfortably into the framework
provided by the FRCP. Perhaps some amendments to FRCP would
be useful.
4. No cases are decided by me through the consent process. No
consents have been received in over 5 years. Plaintiffs want a chance
at two bites out of the apple.
5. The Report & Recommendation process seems to encourage
too much litigation and excessive appeals.
6. Social security cases take up much more time than the run-of-
the-mill civil case for me. As a former colleague told me, "you need
to remember that you are probably the last person who is REALLY
going to look closely at the claim." With that advice in mind, I'm
probably more attentive to them than I would be otherwise.
7. Since 2004, social security cases were placed "on the wheel"
along with all other civil cases. The magistrate judges are randomly
assigned social security cases and only retain them if both parties
consent. If not, they are randomly reassigned to a district judge. The
result is that 100% of our social security cases are on consent. Prior
to 2004, we handled social security cases on both a report and
recommendation or consent basis.
8. I think that I am deciding a mixed question of law and fact in
Question number 1, i.e. applying the facts as decided by the ALJ to
the law. I would be happy to see the creation of a specialized court
for social security appeals, such as the Court of Appeals for Veteran's
Claims, to get the social security appeals before a court devoted
solely to these claims.
9. In answer to Question 1, my answer is that I am deciding a
legal issue which has a factual basis. Similar to, if not like, a
sufficiency of the evidence question.
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10. As to question # 1, of course we deal in factual questions,
although not de novo. These cases are extremely fact-intensive, and I
would call it more a mixed question of law and fact. While deference
is given to an AL's factual determinations (e.g., credibility), and
while the "substantial evidence" standard is purportedly not a high
standard, "deferential review" is not the same as "no review."
11. With respect to the first question, in order to answer the legal
question of whether there is substantial evidence, you have to find the
facts in the record to support the AL's decision, therefore, it is
fundamentally a factual rather than a legal question.
12. Summary judgment as a mechanism makes no sense. There
are always triable issues of fact; we're not asked to decide whether a
factual issue remains, but whether the ALJ got it right. It's really an
appellate review.
13. Question No. 1 is a bit unfair -- you should also have "mixed
question" as an option. In my view, determining what evidence is in
the record is a factual question and determining whether the evidence
in the record constitutes "substantial evidence" to support the AL's
conclusions is a mixed question of law and fact (i.e. applying the
legal standard to the evidence in the record).
14. I typically send out consent forms when a case is referred for
Report & Recommendation. The government always consents. There
are a few lawyers who represent claimants who never consent. Most
others consent the outset of the case.
APPENDIX B - SUGGESTED STANDING ORDER
IN SOCIAL SECURITY CASES
A. Motion and Briefing Guidelines.
(1) A Social Security appeal shall commence with the Complaint,
filed by the Plaintiff. The Government shall respond with an Answer
as in any other civil case. In addition to the Complaint and Answer,
the following shall be filed: (i) Plaintiffs brief in support of reversing
or remanding the decision of the Commissioner; (ii) Government's
response brief in support of affirming the decision of the
Commissioner; and (iii) Plaintiffs reply brief. No motions (e.g.
motions for summary judgment; motions for judgment on the
pleadings; or motions to affirm, reverse, or remand) shall be filed.
(2) In preparing a social security brief, the Plaintiff should do the
following:
(i) Identify the specific grounds for reversal or remand early
in the brief (e.g. the ALJ erred by failing to discuss the treating
physician's recommendation that the Plaintiff is disabled, or the ALJ
erred by failing to include the limitations with Plaintiffs right hand in
the hypothetical to the vocational expert). Be as specific as possible.
(ii) State clearly the relief requested.
(iii) Include only those facts that relate to the issues
presented. It is not necessary to include Plaintiffs entire medical
history if it is not relevant to the issues raised.
(iv) It is not necessary to spend 3-4 pages repeating the well
recognized standards for the five-part test. Cite a case that you
believe accurately states the legal principles you wish the Court to
apply. Make the Court aware of relevant contrary authority.
(v) Attach the AL's decision to the brief.
(3) In responding to Plaintiffs brief, the Commissioner should do
the following:
(i) Consider whether a voluntary remand is appropriate.
(ii) Supplement the Plaintiffs facts where needed for the
issues presented. Do not feel compelled to repeat the facts.
(iii) Cite to those portions of the record that constitute
substantial evidence in support of the AL's decision.
[If this order is made part of a local rule, the following language
promoting consents should be added:]
B. Encouraging consent to a Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction.
(1) The District Court Clerk shall distribute consent forms to the
Plaintiff and the Government after the Answer has been filed.
(2) District Court Judges shall discuss consent with the parties
during the initial appearance before the Court.
(3) If the parties do not consent, the District Court Judge should
decide the case without referring the case to a Magistrate Judge for
report and recommendation.
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